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There ore some philosphers, such as John Mackie, who believe that the 
existence of God is logical lg inconrtpatible w i t h the existence of nrtoral 
e v i l A lv in Plantinga, in a series of books and a r t i c les , a t tempts to 
provide a Libertar ian response to Mackie's arguments. Our paper is an 
examination of th is response, and culminates in the c la im that i f the 
Libertar ian notion of " incl ining, w i thout necessitat ing" i s coherent, 
then i t i s logical lg possible both that God exist and that there be moral 
evi l . In out l ine, our argument is as fo l lows. If the Libertar ian notion of 
" incl in ing, wi thout necessitating" is coherent, then i t is logical lg 
possible both that (F1) f reew i l l and causal determinat ion are 
incompatible, and that (F2) statements of the fo rm " i f p were to obtain, 
then X would f reelg do A" be true. But i f i t is log ica l lg possible that 
both (F l ) and (F2) are true, then i t f o l l ows that Mackie's argument is 
unsound, and Plantinga's response correct. In dealing w i t h various 
object ions to our argument, we show that theg cruc ia l lg depend on the 
(unargued and question-begging) assumption that the Libertar ian notion 
of " incl in ing, wi thout necessitating" is /7oi coherent. 
God and Freedom 
J. Mintoff 
There are several versions of the view that there Is no God. In 
this paper v/e yv'III examine. In part, the strongest claim to this effect -
the claim that logical Inconsistency Is to be found In thelstic belief. 
The most significant expression this has received In recent times 
Issues from hackle: 
1 think, however, that a more telling criticism can be made by 
way of the traditional problem of evil. Here It can be shown, not 
that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are 
positively Irrational, that the several parts of the essential 
theological doctrine are Inconsistent with one another 
(Mack1e[55], p200) 
Amongst Mackle's contemporaries, Aiken and McCloskey are others Y/ho 
share this outlook^ 
Some narrowing of focus, however, wil l be required, as the scope 
of the "traditional problem of evil" Is immense. There are a number of 
reasons for this. Firstly, there are differences In the way that the 
existence of evil Is taken to be a problem for the thelst. For hackle, 
the problem consists In evil's being logically Incompatible v̂ 'lth the 
existence of God; for some thelsts, such as Baslnger (In Bas1nger[78]), 
It consists In evil's providing strong evidence against God's existence; 
Y/hereas, at a more personal level, the problem may consist In the 
difficulty of maintaining faith In the face of personal tragedy. We ŷ IH 
be concerned with hackle's understanding of the problem: How Is It 
JogicâUy possible that God exist and that there be evil ? 
Furthermore, there are differences In what types of evil present 
the most difficulty for the thelst. A broad distinction Is often made 
between moral and physical evil, the former being (roughly) that evil 
which results from free human action and the latter the remaining evil. 
We Y'/111 concentrate on the problem of rnordJ evil. 
We Y/111 adopt a Libertarian understanding of free human action, 
for our discussions vyill centre on Plantlnga's version of the so-called 
"FreeYv'Ill Defense", which has at Its heart a vlevv of free human action 
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that includes the follovying Libertarian components. First, the 
assumption that free v/IH and causal determination are incompatible: 
(Fl) for all persons j< and actions A, if x freely does A then x's doing 
A Y'/as not causally determined. 
It also includes the view that (vv'lth appropriate, minimal, restrictions) 
(F2) for all persons x, actions A and propositions p. It Is logically 
possible that statements of the form "if p were to obtain, then % 
would freely do A" (which we shall call agent subjunctives) be 
true^. 
This second assumption maintains the possibility of agent subjunctives. 
Thus we wil l concentrate on the question: HOYV' IS It logically possible 
that God exist and that there be evil resulting frcfm free hurnorf sets 
^Jnderstood in terms of (Fl) and (F2)] ? 
Another reason for the size of the literature In this area Is the 
great differences in what the notion of "God" Is taken to involve. 
Plantinga claims that at the heart of the major religions - Christianity, 
Judaism and Islam, for example - is belief In God, which is, in part, the 
belief that there is "a personal being who, let's say, has existed from 
eternity. Is almighty, perfectly wise, perfectly just, has created the 
world, and loves his creatures" (Plant1nga[74a],pp1-2). Whether such a 
viev'/ is at the heart of the major religions Is a dispute which v/e wil l 
sidestep, by stipulatively Introducing our own notion of a divine being. 
We assume that 
(Gl) there is a unique person (conscious and existing "in time") who is 
all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good. And this being we call 
God. 
An Important intention of this assumption is that the term "person" be 
taken literally. A person is, amongst other things, an entity with the 
capacity for consciousness. More evocatively (and borrowing from 
Thomas Nagel), a person has a subjective point of view - there Is 
something that It Is like to be that person. A second Important 
Intention Is that such a person be located "In time"^. 
The understanding of the remaining key terms in this definition 
are fairly standard and, pre-reflectively, quite appealing. We say that 
(G2) 8 being x is all-ooyyerfu] (or omnlDotent) If and only If x can 
bring about any logically possible state of affairs, 
(63) X Is all-knov/ing (or omniscient) If and only If x knows all true 
propositions, and 
(G4) X Is all-good (or ornnlbenevolent) if and only If x does only Vv'hat 
Is permitted, and everything that x (morally) ought. 
The first two will require modification, but are useful as a starting 
point for our focus on the question: How Is It logically possible that God 
understood In terms of (G1) to (G4)] exist and that there be evil 
resulting from free human acts [understood In terms of (F1) and (F2)] ? 
In section I v̂ ê will examine hackle's argument to the claim that 
this Is not logically possible. Plantlnga's reply Is detailed In section II, 
where this argument of hackle's Is shown to be unsound, and then a 
proof provided for the possibility of God's existing and there being 
moral evil. This will complete the exposition of the Freewill Defense. 
In the subsequent sections of the paper the focus shifts from 
matters theological to those more metaphysical. We will see the 
Importance that (F1) and (F2) play in the validity of the arguments in 
section II. This Vv'in be the catalyst for our shift of focus to the 
question: How Is it logically possible that (F1) and (F2) be true 
together? 
The nub of this issue lies in the analysis of agent subjunctives. 
In section III v/e V'/ill provide a number of conditions that any analysis 
of agent subjunctives must satisfy if It is to be sufficient to 
Plantlnga's task, and suggest that the "incline, without necessitating" 
notion common amongst Libertarians satisfies these conditions. Of 
course, not everyone agrees that (F1) and (F2) jointly possible, and 
In the last two sections, we will show that significant criticisms of 
Plantlnga's position reduce to the claim that (Fl) and (F2) are jointly 
Incompatible with the observation that 
(S) subjunctive statements can be true only if there are other 
factors which, m ih the antecedent's being true, causally 
determine the consequent's being true. 
According to (S), the only feasible analysis of agent subjunctives Is one 
in which x's freely doing A is ceusally determined. It is no surprise that 
Libertarians would deny (S), and do so by providing their "incline, 
without necessitating" notion as an alternative analysis. In section IV, 
we wi l l examine the arguments of Hobart, vr'ho accepts (F2) and (S) and 
so denies (F1) - freev/ill involves determination and is inconceivable 
without it. Then in section V, we wi l l look at the arguments of Adams, 
Yî ho accepts (F1) and (S) and so denies (F2) - there cannot be any truth 
or falsity in vv'hat any person would do if some state of affairs were to 
obtain. To conclude in section VI, we Vv'ill claim that if there is a 
coherent notion of "inclining, without necessitating" then Plantinga's 
argument is vindicated - it is logically possible that God exist and that 
there be evil resulting from free human acts. 
So, how is it logically possible that God exist and that there be 
evil resulting from free human acts? One ansvY'er is that it is not 
possible. In this section we wil l present Plantinga's discussion of the 
following argument of hackle's for this view: 
If God has made men such that in their free choices they 
sometimes prefer what Is good and sometimes Vv'hat is evil, why 
could he not have made men such that they always freely choose 
the good? If there Is no logical impossibility In a man's freely 
choosing the good on one, or on several occasions, there cannot 
be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on 
every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice between 
making Innocent automata and making beings vyho, in acting 
freely, would sometimes go wrong; there Vv'as open to him the 
obviously better possibility of making beings who would act 
freely but always go right. Clearly, his failure to avail himself 
of this possibility Is Inconsistent v-nth his being both 
omnipotent and wholly good. (Î1ack1e[55l,p209) 
This argument Is Interpreted In a number of different vyays In 
Plant1nga[65]. The first proceeds as follovys: 
(1) God Is omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good, and 
(2) If God Is omnipotent, then God can bring about any logically 
possible state of affairs. 
Thus 
(3) God can bring about any logically possible state of affairs. 
However, 
(4) that all free persons do what is right on every occasion Is a 
logically possible state of affairs, 
and therefore 
(5) God can create persons such that they always do what Is right. 
But 
(6) If God can create free persons such that they always do what Is 
right, and He Is all-good and omniscient, then any free persons 
created by Him alv-zays do what Is right. 
Thus 
(7) Any free person created by God alvt'ays does what Is right. 
As (2) is a definition, and (4) and (6) are necessarily true, then (1) 
entails (7). But, as well as belief In an omniscient, omnipotent and 
all-good God, the essential theological doctrine Includes belief In the 
sinfulness of (free) human beings. It Is therefore Inconsistent. 
The problem with this Is that (2), an Instance of (G2), is false. 
That there are beings not created by God Is a logically possible state of 
affairs, but these are not beings that God can create, notwithstanding 
His omnipotence, as the statement "God can bring about a state of 
affairs not brought about by God" Is Inconsistent^. The argument Is thus 
unsound. 
The attempt to deol with this problem leads to Plontlngo's 
second Interpretation of Hackle's argument. It begins by adopting a 
y/eaker notion of omnlpotence: 
(G2') X Is omnipotent If and only If x can bring about any state of 
affairs p such that "x brings It about that p" Is consistent^. 
The appropriate section of the argument is then modified to read: 
(1) God Is omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good, and 
(2') If God Is omnipotent, then God can bring about any logically 
possible state of affairs p such that "God brings It about that p" 
Is consistent. 
Thus 
(3') God can bring about any logically possible state of affairs p such 
thot "God brings it obout thai p" is consistent. 
Hov/ever 
{4') "God creates free persons such that they alv/ays do vv'hat is 
right" is consistent. 
And therefore 
(5) God can create persons such that they alvyays do what is right. 
And so on. 
Plontingo thinks that there are problems with this version of the 
argument also. (4') is ambiguous. It may mean 
(4'a) "God brings it about that (there are free persons and they alvyays 
do Yv'hat is right)" is consistent 
or it may mean 
(4'b) "God brings it about that (there are free persons) and they 
always do what is nght" is consistent. 
But, given (F1), it follows that (4'a) is false. If the argument is to be 
sound, (4') must then be interpreted as (4'b). However, even if we do 
this, (5) does not seem to follow from (3') and (4'b), for what does 
immediately follow from this pair is only that God can bring it about 
that (there are free persons), which does not imply that God can create 
free persons such that they always do what is right. The argument again 
seems to be unsuccessful. 
This latest of Plontinga's objections to Mackie's argument 
includes the assertion that (Fl) implies the falsity of (4'a). This 
implication does not hold, and only appears to do so because of an 
ambiguity in the expression "brings It about that". 
This disambiguation Is one that first explicitly appears in 
Plantlnga's own (later) writings (Plantinga[74a,bl) and can be motivated 
as follows. It seems as though there are two types of situation in which 
God brings It about that Anna, say, has cornflakes for breakfast as soon 
as she gets up. He may causally determine that she do so, by setting off 
the alarm and then subtly controlling her limbs, so that vyhlle having 
cornflakes for breakfast Is something that Anna does. It Is not 
something she does freely, for she had had no intention of so doing. 
Alternatively, If God knevy that v/ere He to set off the alarm, Anna 
Y'/ould (freely) have cornflakes for breakfast anyway, He could again 
bring It about, that she did so, just by setting off the alarm. Anna would 
have had the cornflakes, God would have (in a weaker sense) brought 
this about, and no restriction of Anna's freedom v/ould have been 
Involved. The ambiguity In (4'a) can now be brought out In the following 
definitions. 'We say that 
(8) an agent x can (strongly) bring about (or, strongly actuallse) a 
state of affairs p If and only If x can causally determine that p 
obtain, and 
(9) an agent x can vv̂ eakly bring about (or, weakly actuallse) a state 
of affairs p if and only if x can strongly actuallse some state of 
affairs q such that if x v/ere to strongly actuallse q, then p 
would obtain. 
The exercising of these abilities is defined similarly. (4'a) is thus 
ambiguous between 
(4'a1) It is logically possible that God strongly brings it about that 
(there are free persons and that they always do what is right) 
and 
(4'a2) It is logically possible that God wedkJy it about that 
(there are free persons and that they always do what is right). 
What is at issue is not whether God could have strongly brought about a 
morally perfect v/orld (for it seems to follow from (Fl) that this is not 
logically possible) but rather whether God could hove weokJy brought 
this about. That is, whether there was something that He could have 
done that, were He to do it, would have resulted in a morally perfect 
v/orld. 
It seems unproblematic that (Fl) should Imply the falsity of 
(4'a1). In.order to strongly bring it about that there are free persons and 
that they alVi'ays do what is right, it vyould have been necessary for God 
to first create some free beings and then strongly bring it about that 
they do what is right on all occasions. But the only way that God could 
have done this latter is if, on every occasion when one of these free 
beings was facing a moral decision. He strongly brought it about that 
they freely refrained from wrongdoing. But this is just what (Fl) denies 
is possible, and so (4'a1) Is false^. 
Also unproblematic is that (F1) should not imply the falsity of 
(4'32). Suppose that for each person K and each morally right act B that 
X might do, there is some enticing state of affairs Ê ,̂  such that if God 
were to (strongly) bring i t about that Ê g obtain, then K would freely do 
B. Suppose further that i t is 'within God's power to jointly bnng about 
all the for such persons and acts. That this is a possitJe 
situation follows from (F2). But if i t dciually obtains, then God Cdn 
weakly bring i t about that (there are free persons and they always do 
what is right), for God could (strongly) bring about all the and if 
He were to do this, then all the free persons would alvyays do what is 
right. In other words, if everyone has a price, then God can weakly bring 
i t about that they freely do any act at all. 
Thus when the ambiguous statement, (4'a), is interpreted in 
temis of strong actualisation, Mackie's argument fails because i t 
follows from (FÎ) that God cannot strongly actualise a morally perfect 
world, for this act of God's would involve restrictions on the free acts 
of humans. Interpreting Mackie, then, in terms of weak actualisation 
leads to a third version of his argument, as follows: 
(1) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good, and 
(2") If God is omnipotent, and "God Vv'eakly actualises p" is 
consistent, then God can weakly actualise p. 
Thus 
(3") God can weakly actualise any state of affairs p such that "God 
weakly actualises p" is consistent. 
Nov-/, as was shown in the previous paragraph, 
(4") i t is logically possible that God weakly bring i t about that 
(there are free persons and they always do what is right), 
and so 
(5") God ¿rvâ Yv'eakly bring i t about that (there are free persons and 
they always do what is right) 
But, 
(6") If God can weakly bring this about, and He is all-good and 
omniscient, then there are free persons and they alV'/ays do what 
is right. 
It follows that 
(7) Any free person created by God always does Vv'hat is right. 
Hence i t is not logically possible that God exist and that there be evil 
resUiUng from free action. 
There are various lines of attack that one may take v îth this 
argument. Plantlnga opts for a denial of (2"), Adams for the denial of 
(4"), and certain "soul-rnaklng" theodlclsts for the denial of (6"). !n the 
next section, v-ze examine the path that Plantlnga has taken"̂ . 
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Hackle's argument Is unsound because one of Its premises, (1.2"), 
Is false - God's being ornlnpotent does not entail His being able to 
weakly actuallse any state of affairs p for which "God weakly 
actuallses p" Is consistent. This will occupy us In the first part of this 
section. But not only is hackle's argument unsound. It Is actually 
possible to provide an argument to the opposite conclusion - It can be 
shoYi'n that It is logically possible that God exist and that there be evil 
resulting from free human action. This will occupy us In the second 
part. Both of these claims depend on (F1) and (F2) being true together. 
However, before we can show why hackle's argument Is unsound, 
a fey/ (technical) preliminaries must be got out of the way: 
(a) The analyses of logical necessity and possibility are standard. A 
proposition p Is logically possible (or op) If and only If there Is some 
possible world In which It Is true, and Is necessary (or Dp) If and only 
If It Is true In all possible worlds. Possible worlds themselves are to 
be understood as maximal consistent states of affairs. A state of 
affairs S includes another T If It Is not possible that S obtain andT not, 
and precludes T if It Is not possible that S end T obtain together. 
(b) In any possible world W, there may be many states of affairs 
included In W that God strongly actuallses. We can, so to speak, collect 
these together to form T^, the Jdrgest state of affairs that God 
strongly actuallses In Vf God's strongly actual!sing T.̂^ Is included in W, 
and T̂ ^ Includes every state of affairs God strongly actuallses In V-/. If 
God does not exist In V̂ , then T,̂ ^ Is the contradictory (empty) state of 
affairs. 
(c) Follov'/ing Plantlnga, v/e abbreviate "God strongly actuallses state of 
affairs p" by "Gp". Thus "GT "̂ represents "God strongly actualises T,̂  
(d) The subjunctive "if p were true, then q would be true" plays a key 
role in the discussion. V̂ e distinguish the following: 
(i) Our intuitive understanding of this statement, 
(ii) Lewis's understanding, which holds that such a statement is true 
if and only if either p is impossible or some world W in which p 
and q hold is more similar (to the actual world) than any world 
in which p and not-q hold®. And, 
(iii) Another sense, which is that understendiifg of the subjimctive 
that Piantiifga's argument actually requires in order to succeed 
This will be denoted by "p •-> q", Vv'hich we have appropriated 
from Lewis. 
These are distinguished so as to leave open not only the question of 
whether Levyis' analysis is adequate to our intuitons regarding 
subjunctives, but also to leave open the question of whether it is Lewis' 
analysis (or perhaps some other) which is the one appropriate to 
Plantinga's argument. Later in the paper we will see that the three 
come apart, although Plantinga seems to assume that Lewis' analysis is 
adequate and argues accordingly. 
(e) On the assumption, however, that either our intuitive understanding 
or Lewis's understanding of the subjunctive locution /.̂ adequate, it 
follows that 
( I ) if W is a possible world and p a logically possible state of 
affairs such that p •-> vy, then W includes p. 
Intuitively, this is obvious. On Lewis's analysis, if p •-> W and p is 
logically possible it follows that there is a world W* in v/hich p and W 
obtain.and which is more similar (to the actual world) than any world in 
v/hich p and not-W obtain. But as W is included in it is the same 
world as W*, and so p is included in W, as it is included in Vv'*. 
(f) The subjunctive "if p were true, then q might be true" also occurs in 
the argument, and similar comments to those in (d) apply. Note that the 
negation of "If p were true, then q would be true" is "if p were true, 
then q might be false". Thus the "might" subjunctive that Plantinga 
actually requires, to be denoted by "p o-> q", is equivalent to "not-(p 
•-> not-q)". 
(g) Again assuming that either our intuitive understanding or LeV'/ls's 
understanding of the subjunctive locution is adequate to Plantinga's 
task, we can shovv' that 
(2) if a possible world W precludes state of affairs p and 0-> 
P, then God cannot vt'eakly actualise W. 
For suppose God cdn Vv'eakly actualise Vf In other words, suppose there 
is some state of affairs C that God can strongly actualise and such that 
GC •-> W. Now as God car/ strongly actualise C, then GC Is a logically 
possible state of affairs and so W Includes GC (by (1)X According to the 
definition of T̂  this implies that T̂  includes C and so includes GC. 
That is, Ddf GT̂ , then GC). But from this and GC •-> W it follows by 
transitivity that GT.̂  •-> Ŵ . As W is o possible world which precludes 
p. It is one that inciudes not-p, and so GT̂  •-> not-p, or alternatively 
not-(GT.̂  o-> p). Hence if W precludes p and GT̂  0-> p then God cannot 
weakly actualise W. That is to say. If everything that God does in V</ 
still might not result in Vfs being actual, then God cannot even weakly 
actualise W, as there is nothing that God can do that would lead to Vfs 
being actual. 
This completes our preliminary comments. 
To now return to the point, we show that Mackie's argument Is 
unsound because It relies on the false premise: 
(L2") If God Is omnipotent, and "God weakly actualises p" is 
consistent, then God can vyeakly actualise p. 
Consider Curly Smith, the mayor of Boston (and a regular In Plantinga's 
arguments), who is offered a bribe of $20,000 to drop his opposition to 
a proposed freevv̂ ay route through the Old North Church along with some 
other antiquated and structually unsound buildings. Plantlnga claims 
that 
(3) there are possible y/orlds and Vv'* such that (a) God exists in 
both W and V̂ *, T̂  Is the same as T̂ ^̂ , W Includes Curley's freely 
accepting the bribe, and V/* includes Curley's freely rejecting 
the bribe, and (b) It is logically possible that God weakly 
actuallse W; and similarly for V/*. 
He says: 
let Vi/ be a world V'/here God exists, v^here Curley Is free v/lth 
respect to the action of taking a $20,000 bribe, and Vv'here he 
accepts it; and as before, let T [our T,̂ ] be the largest state of 
affairs God strongly actualtses In Vf God's actuallsing T (GT) 
Includes neither Curley's accepting the bribe (A) nor his 
rejecting it (not-A) [for these are free actions and so cannot be 
logically included in T, which is v-zhat God sirorfgjy actualises In 
W. This is a consequence of (Fl)]; so there is a world W* where 
God strongly actualises T and in which Curley rejects the bribe. 
(Pl8nt1nga[74bl,ppl82-183) 
Because Plantlnga does not further argue, but just assumes, that God's 
weakly actuallsing W and W* Is logically possible, we wi l l f i l l In the 
gap in his argument as follows. Consider W* first. Suppose that: evenj 
state of affairs in W* of the fonri "x freely does B" Is such that GT̂ ^̂  
•-> X freely does B. Then God can weakly bring these states of affairs 
about (by strongly actualislng T^ ,̂ something He can strongly do). And 
so as God can, in any case, sirongly actuallse any states of affairs In 
W* this form (for they do not involve free human acts), then God 
can weakly actuallse dJl of W*. That this supposition is logically 
possible is 0 consequence of (F2). Hence it is also logically possible 
that God weakly actualise W*, and similar comments apply for W. Thus 
(3) is true. 
Consider then these two possible vyorlds, W and W*. Letting A be 
Curley's accepting the bribe, then either GT^ •-> A or not-(GT^ •-> A), 
and so as T^ is T̂ ^ then either GT̂ ^ •-> A or GT^ 0-'> not-A. But as W* 
precludes A (it includes not-A) It follows from (2) that 
(4) gT.,̂ ^ o-> a implies that God cannot weakly actuallse W*. 
As GT^* •-> A implies that GT^» o-> A, then 
(5) GT̂ *̂ •-> A implies that God cannot weakly actuallse V/*, 
As Vy precludes nol-A (it includes A) then it follov/s from (2) that 
(6) GT.̂ ^ 0-> not-A Implies that God cannot weakly actuallse Vf 
Either way 
(7) there are possible worlds that God cannot weakly actualise, even 
though it is logicdUy possible that He actualise thern. 
But as (7) is entailed by necessary truths, it is itself a necessary tnjth. 
God's being omnipotent is logically possible. Thus God's being 
omnipotent does rfoi entail that He can weakly actualise every state of 
affairs p for which "God weakly actualises p" is logically possible, 
Mackie's argument is unsound. 
But not only is his argument unsound, we are actually able to 
provide an argument to the opposite conclusion - it is logically posible 
that God exist and that there be evil resulting from free human acts. 
As our good friend Curley is a free human agent, it is presumably 
logically possible (though perhaps unlikely) that he always freely do 
vyhat is right. There are possible worlds, let us call them Curley-ideal 
v^orlds, in which he is free with respect to some morally significant 
action, and in which he only does what is right. Suppose that W is one of 
these, and suppose also that there is some morally wrong action A such 
that if God were to strongly actualise T^, then Curley would freely do 
A. (F2) assures us that such a supposition is coherent. Then it follows 
from (2) above that God cannot weakly actualise vy, because W, being a 
Y/orld in which Curley does no wrong, precludes Curley's doing the 
morally v/rong action A. Suppose, even further, that oil Curley-ideal 
worlds are like this. Then there is no Curley-ideal v/orld that God can 
weakly actualise. In this case Curley suffers from a rather unfortunate 
malady: transY/orld depravity, hore generally, 
(8) a person x suffers from transVv^orld depravity if and only if for 
every x-ideal v/orld V/ there is some morally vyrong action A 
such that GT̂ ^ •-> x freely does A. 
As we have seen, from this it follows that if x is transworld depraved, 
then God cannot v^eakly actualise any x-ideal Vv'orld. It is presumably 
loglcally possible on the basis of (F2) thot 
(9) 6od exists. He create free persons, and that they all suffer from 
transworld depravity. 
But If everyone dfd suffer from this affliction, then (1 0 tells us that 
there would be no morally perfect world that God could weakly 
actualise. Hence, every actual free person would perform at least one 
morally wrong act, and so 
(10) there wm¡(f be evil resulting from free human acts. 
As (9), which Is logically possible, entails (10) then it Is logically 
possible that God exist and that there be evil resulting from free human 
action^^. 
Ill 
The above positive argument of Plantinga actually needs to be 
tightened up In a number of places. For example, while It may be true 
that It Is logically possible that all dciudJ persons be transworld 
depraved, might not there be possible persons (however this term Is to 
be understood) who do not suffer from this dreaded affllcatlon and who 
God could have created Instead of those beings he did create, and so 
produce a morally perfect world? The answer, of course. Is to suggest 
that It Is logically possible that all possible persons be transworld 
depraved, and to run the rest of the argument as previously. In any case, 
VT'e win not go Into the details of this v/ay, or other ways, that the 
argument might be strengthened. 
Instead, v/e shift our focus from these theological Issues to 
more metaphysical ones. We have seen In the above section the Vv'ays In 
V'/h1ch Pliantlnga's arguments depend on the Libertarian view embodied 
In (F1) and (F2). Vi'e now consider the question: Hovv' Is it logically 
possible that (F1) and (F2) be true together? 
The nub of this issue lies in our understanding of agency and the 
onolysis of agent subjunctives. In this section we avoid questions 
dealing directly vyith agency, and Instead provide a number of 
conditions that any analysis of agent subjunctives will have to satisfy 
if It is to be sufficient to Plantinga's task. To recollect, "p •-> q" 
denotes ttidt understanding of the locution "If p were true, then q would 
be true" which Plantinga's argument dctudJJy requires in order to 
succeed. Vv̂e Vv'i]] suggest that it is the Libertarian notion "p inclines, 
yyithout necessitating that q" that satisfies these conditions. 
Our first tY'/o conditions ore motivated by the consideration that 
"p • - > q" is in part an attempt to provide a basis for the truth of 
ordinary agent subjunctives which does not imply that q is causally 
determined. Thus on the one hand it must be that 
(CI) p • - > q does not imply that q is causally determined. 
For Plantinga wants to say that it is logically possible for God to 
Yi'eakly (though not strongly) actualise Anna's freely having cornflakes, 
and so logically possible that there be some state of affairs C such 
that: God strongly actualises C • - > Anna freely has cornflakes. If "p • -> 
q" implied that q was causally determined, then Anna's having 
cornflakes Y-/ould have been causally determined, and so not free after 
all. In fact, the notion that Plantinga requires may satisy the obviously 
stronger condition that 
( c r ) p • - > q implies that q is noi causally determined. 
On the other hand, for "p • - > q" to be able to provide a basis for 
ordinary agent subjunctives, we need the following connection between 
these two notions: 
(C2) p 0 -> q implies that if p were true, then q would be true. 
These two conditions, (CI) and (C2), give us the room to explain the 
possibility of (FO and (F2). If "God sets off the alarm • - > Anna wakes 
up and freely has cornflakes for breakfast" is true then it follows that 
were God to do this, Anna would have cornflakes for breakfast, but that 
her doing so would not be causally determined, for "God sets off the 
alarm •-> Anna wakes up and freely has cornflakes for breakfast" does 
not imply this. Thus if it is possible for statements of the form "p • -> 
q" to be true, then it is possible that (Fl) and (F2) be true together. 
Our next two conditions are motivated by the consideration that 
"p • -> q" is to be in part a cdusdl notion. We can best see this by 
examining the account that Plantinga attempts to give of this idea, 
Which seems to include the adoption of either the Stelnaker or Lewis 
possible Y'/orld analysis of subjunctives, Plantinga devotes a whole 
section of Chapter 9 of Plantinga[74b] to a discussion of these viev^'s, 
and enriploys them in one of his arguments (Plantinga[74b],p181). 
Hov/ever, there is o problem with adopting Lewis' account of 
subjunctive statements. (V-Ze will ignore Stalnakers' account altogether, 
as it entails, rather implausibly, that either if p were true, then q 
V'/ould be true or if p v/ere true, then not-q v/ould be true). For consider 
the question: In what sense does God actualise the dciiwl vv^orld? 
Armed v/ith our definition above, (1.9), of God's being able to actualise a 
possible state of affairs p we may provide the follov/ing analysis of 
God's V'/eakly actualising, as opposed to God's being oble to weakly 
actualise, a possible world W: 
(1) X weakly actualises VV if and only if there is some state of 
affairs C that x strongly actualises such that : x strongly 
actualises C • - > Ví̂  obtains. 
If Lewis's analysis Is the understanding of subjunctives that Plantinga 
requires, then (1) unfortunately runs aground of the inference 
(2) p, q / therefore, p • - > q 
which is valid In Lewis's semantics. Following Plantinga, we will call 
the actual world "Kronos". Suppose that in Kronos Anna has cornflakes 
for breakfast. Then chose any statement p Included in Kronos. As Kronos 
Is actual, then p Is true and so by (2) it follows that: Anna has 
cornflakes for breakfast • - > p. As this Is true for all states of affairs 
p In Kronos, then: Anna has cornflakes for breakfast Kronos obtains. 
Anna Is v/eakly actualising the actual world! Hence Lewis' analysis is 
not the understanding of subjunctives that Plantinga requires^^ The 
above also indicates that another condition needed Is that 
(C3) p <5c. q does not imply p • - > q. 
However, It still seems as though Plantlnga's analysis has 
problems, even If we suppose that It Is our Intuitive understanding of 
subjunctives which is the understanding that Plantinga requires. For 
there seem to be quite plausible situations which, according to the 
above definition of "weakly actualise", Imply that God, or anyone else, 
can weakly actualise a past event which did not occur. For example, 
suppose that God banished Adam and Eve on Tuesday of the second week 
of creation. And suppose that He did this because they ate the apple on 
the day before, Monday. That is, if God hadn't banished Adam and Eve on 
Tuesday, then they v/ould not have eaten the apple on the proceeding 
rionday. More to the point: 
(3) if It vvere the case that God did not banish Adam and Eve on 
Tuesday, then it vyould be the case that Adam and Eve did not eat 
the apple on Monday 
or, still 
(3') God did not banish Adam and Eve on Tuesday • -> Adam and Eve 
did not eat the apple on Monday. 
So, as not banishing Adam and Eve on Tuesday Is something that God 
could have strongly brought about, then God could have, on Tuesday, 
weakly brought It about that Adam and Eve did not eat the apple on 
Monday. This, however, is false. Ordinary subjunctives, in general, do 
not presuppose that the antecedent obtained no later than the 
consequent. Yet another condition is required: 
(C4) If (p Is true at t̂  • - > q Is true at 12), then t̂  is not later than {2-
These two conditions, (C3) and {C4), Indicate that the notion the 
argument needs Is In some sense a causal notion. First, it does not 
follov/ from the fact that two states of affairs obtain that there Is a 
causal connection between them. And second, causes occur no later than 
their effects. 
Our last condition is motivated by the consideration that 
Plantlnga's argument as stated Is to remain valid, given that what he 
understands by subjunctives Is neither what we ordinarily understand 
by them, nor what Lewis understands by them. It ought to be that 
(C5) "p • - > q" behaves, for the most part, like what we usually 
understand by the locution "if p v/ere true, then q vyould be true". 
The notion that Plantlnga's argument requires should be sufficiently 
similar to the locution "If p were true, then q would be true" so as to 
ensure the validity of the argument presented In section II, and need 
- w -
differ only in sotlsfying conditions (CI ) to (C4). Admittedly vogue, this 
last condition is an application of the principle of charity. 
!t may be that there are other conditions that any notion 
sufficient to Plantinga's task must satisfy, but v/e tenatively suggest 
that If there Is a notion satisfying (C I ) to (C5), then Plantinga's 
argument is successful. 
Indeed, it appears that there is such o notion. It is the 
Libertarian notion of "inclining, without necessitating": 
(C I ) If p Inclines, without necessitating, that q then it obviously does 
not follOYv' that q is causally determined. It may even be that it Implies 
q I s /7r//causally determined, but this Is problematic, because vv'hlle p 
might not necessitate that q, there may be another state of affairs r 
that does. 
(C2) If p inclines without necessitating that q, if p thus infJuences 
Y/1thout necessitating that q, then, given a strong enough construal of 
this influence, it follows that If p were to obtain, then q would also. 
The Intuitive Idea behind "a strong enough construal" of this Influence 
is as follows. Lewis has shown that the truth of "If p were true, then q 
V'/ould be true" does not depend on p's being causally sufficient for q 
(See Note 8). It depends Instead on how much more likely It Is that p and 
q be true than that p and not-q be true. A "strong enough" construal of 
p's Influence on q, then. Is one that makes It sufficiently more likely 
that p and q be true than that p and not-q be true (so that If p were true, 
then q would be true) without this Influence being so strong that It 
makes p causally sufficient for q, and without Its Implying that there 
might be some other factors which, with p, are causally sufficient for 
q. 
(C3) From the fact that two states of affairs obtain it does not follow 
that one Influenced the other, and so does not follovv' that one inclined 
without necessitating the other. The fabric of influence is not so 
detailed as to connect any two states of affairs. 
(C4) Influence cannot run backv/ard In time. If p and q obtained and p 
Influenced v-zlthout necessitating that q, then p must have obtained at a 
time no later than q. 
(C5) The question of whether "Inclines, v/ithout necessitating" is 
sufficiently like V'/hat Vv'e usually understand by subjunctives depends 
on the explication that is given of "inclines, 'without necessitating". As 
it is not sharply enough defined to allov^ an answer either v/ay on this 
question, this last condition is better thought of as providing a 
direction in v^hich the notion ought to be sharpened, if it is to do some 
of the philosphical vyork allocated to it. 
There are those, however, vyho doubt that the notion of "incline, 
Y/ithout necessitating" makes any sense at all, and who would also 
doubt that there was any notion that satisfied (CI) to (C5). It does 
seem, nonetheless, that if "inclines, without necessitating" is coherent, 
then it satisfies these conditions, thus vindicating Plantinga's 
aroument. 
IV 
There ore significant objections to Plantinga's position which 
reduce to the claim that (F1) (free action is not causally determined) 
and (F2) (agent subjunctives are possible) are jointly incompatible with 
the observation, (S), that subjunctive statements can be true only if 
there are other factors which, with the antecedent's being true, 
causally determine the consequent's being true. In this section we 
consider responses to Plantinga which accept (S) and (F2), and so reject 
(Fl). 
Our storting point is Burch[79] who responds to Plantinga's 
argument to the conclusion, (11.3a), that there are possible vyorlds 'W 
and W* in v/hich God e>iists, T^ is identical to J^^, W includes Curley's 
freely accepting the bribe, and W* includes his freely rejecting it. 
Burch argues against this claim by showing that Plantinga's argument 
for it is invalid. He firstly shows, correctly and more generally than 
Plantinga, that 
( D if God can weakly actualise both W and W*, then T,̂  = T̂ ^̂  and 
only if Vv' = Vv'*^^ 
According to Plantinga there are distinct possible worlds VV and V/* for 
which T^ = J^^ and so it follov/s that there is some possible world that Vr W ' 
God cannot v/eakiy actuslise (either W or W*). As the Leibnizian wants 
to deny this (God can yyeakly actualise aJ] possible worlds), it must be 
denied that there could be two such possible worius, and denied bu 
pointing out that 
the argument begs the question by assunrnng a proposition that 
the Leibnizian should rush to deny: namely, that the largest state 
of affairs that God actualises in Vv* [our T,̂ ^̂ ] is T, namely the 
very sdme state of affairs that Is the largest state of affairs 
God actualises In W (ourl. 1 (Burchi79l,p29:italic£ added/ 
If we look at Plantinga's argument Vv'e see that It depends on the 
inference from not including Curley's rejecting the bribe to the 
claim that there Is thus another possible v/orld V-/* which Includes God's 
strongly actual 1 sing exdcily T,̂ ^ (and so T,^ = T^^^) and Curley's rejecting 
the bribe. However, all that siriciJy follows Is that there Is a possible 
world 'W* which includes God's strongly actualislng T,̂ ^ {tfui perhaps 
strongly ôciuôlfsing moré and Curley's rejecting the bribe. Plantinga's 
argument is thus invalid. 
However this seems to be the wrong place to apply pressure to 
the argument. For, it i s possible to provide another argument to the 
conclusion that Plantinga requires, (11.3a), without making this doubtful 
inference. For consider a possible state of affairs S where (1) God 
exists and the only actions that He (strongly) performs are Â  through 
\ (so that Tg is the conjunctive state of affairs k^h .. /&.. and (11) 
Curly i s offered the bribe and he freely accepts It or freely rejects It. 
Then S does r/oi Include Curley's freely accepting the bribe. For suppose 
that it did. This i s to say that (1) and (11) together Imply that Curley 
freely accepts the bribe. But as (11) does not imply this, then it must be 
(i) that does. That i s ,T5 Includes Curley's freely accepting the bribe, or 
In other words, v/hat God strongly does in S Includes Curley's freely 
accepting it. But, according to (Fl), this Is not possible. Hence It Is 
logically possible that: S and Curley does not freely accept the bribe. 
But in S Curley either freely does or freely refrains from this act, and 
so it is logically possible that: S and Curley freely rejects the bribe. 
Which is to soy that there Is o possible world W* In which God exists, 
T y * is A^ & . . . Aŷ , and which includes Curley's freely rejecting the 
bribe. Similarly, there is another possible world W in which God exists, 
T is A^ . . . L \ (and so T^ is T̂ ^̂ )̂, and which Includes Curley's 
freeiy accBpting the bribe. This argument lacks the Inference that 
Burch finds troublesome, and depends crucially Instead on 
incompatibilism, (Fl). It is at this point that Plantinga's argument is 
vulnerable, and at this point that he and the Leibnizian fundamentally 
disagree. That they should also disagree about the problematic 
inference is a consequence of this more fundamental dissagreement. 
Thus to dispute (lL3a) one can argue against incompatibilism, 
(Fl). Hobart presents two arguments against this view. He argues that, 
pace Plantinga, x's freely doing action A implies that x's doing A is 
causally determined. This yyould entail that Libertarianism denies the 
possibility of free action. His first argument claims that as an act not 
caused is one not proceeding from rne, it is not my eci-. 
In proportion as en act of volition starts of itself without cause 
it is exactly, so far as the freedom of the individual is 
concerned, as if it had been throvv'n into his mind from vv'ithout -
"suggested" to him - by a freakish demon. It is exactly like It In 
this respect, that in neither case does the volition ... come out 
of him. (Berofsky[66],p70) 
Hobart speaks of "acts of volition", but the same could said about acts 
simpliciier Cathy (freely) does k only if her doing A proceeds from 
Cathy herself, and 
(2) this could only be so if her desire to do A and/or her character 
causally contribute, in some way, to her doing A. 
But if one event causally contributes to another, the second must be 
causally determined as, in general, 
(3) an event Ê  causally contributes to the occurence of an event E2 
only If there are other events which, with E ,̂ causally determine 
£2-
'What other understanding of causation, of causal contribution, could 
there be? (This Is Hobart's version of (S).) Thus Cathy (freely) does A 
only if her doing A Is causally determined. The very possibility of 
action requires that this be so. 
It Is easy to see v/hat Plantlnga's reply ought to be: (2) and (3) 
cannot be true together. He might argue as follov'/s: (2) is true only on 
the condition that "causally contributes" be understood as "influences, 
Y'/ithout necessitating", for he has no desire to deny that desires and 
character pdrtidUy influence human behaviour, but denies only that 
they toidJJy do so. But, in this case, the argument is either unsound or 
invalid. If "causally contributes" is similarly understood in (3), then (3) 
I s false, because contradictory. If not so understood, then it no longer 
folloYVS from (2) and (3) that Cathy's doing A is causally determined. 
The second argument that Hobart offers states that as an act not 
caused by rne is one from which I could not refrain, it is not rny free 
act: 
The freedom of anyone surely always implies his possession of o 
poY/er, . . . A person has a power if it a fact that when he sets 
himself in the appropnate manner to produce a certain event 
that event v/ill actually follow. . .. Thus povv'er depends upon, or 
rather consists in, a law. The lavv' in question takes the familar 
form that if something happens a certain something else vv'ill 
happen. (Berofsky[66],p72) 
Hobart seems in this passage to be presupposing that subjunctives of 
the form "if p were true, then q would be true" imply that q is causally 
determined. Vt'hy might he believe this? Perhaps he believes it implies 
that p causally determines q. This is not a valid inference (See Note 8). 
On the other hand, perhaps he believes the vv'eaker assumption, (S), that 
such subjunctives need only be bdckedby, rather than identicdJ with, a 
statement refering to events (including p) which are causally sufficient 
for q. Thus, Cathy does A freely only if she has the power to refrain 
from so doing. But, In general, if x has the power to do A then it must be 
that If X Y/ere to desire (intend,...) to do B, then x would do A. But 
(5) such a subjunctive claim can only be true if there are other 
events which, with Cathy's desiring (intending, . . .) to do A, 
causally determine that she do A. 
Thus Cathy can do A freely only if her performing this act is causally 
determined. 
A weak point In this argument is the assumption that "cans" are 
constitutionally iffy. This Is an area of much dispute, which we gladly 
Sidestep by pointing out that it is, in any case, (4) where the 
Llberatarlan can apply pressure, by insisting that "infuence, vt'ithout 
necessitation" can ground subjunctive judgennents (see condition (C2)), 
and so that such judgments need not be grounded in statements which 
imply that q is causally determined. 
Hobart's arguments, then, are ineffective against a Libertarian 
armed with a coherent notion that satisfies (CI) to (C5). His arguments 
beg the question to the extent that they assume that there Is no such 
notion. 
V 
Hobart accepts both, (S), the analysis of subjunctives in terms 
of causal determination, and (F2), the possibility of agent subjunctives, 
thus arguing that free action Is possible only If it Is causally 
determined. In this section we consider Adam's response to Plantlnga, 
in which the possibility of agent subjunctives is denied, because of the 
acceptence of (S) and (Ft). We will examine three such arguments. 
Adams says that he has Yested an important part of [his] 
argument on the assumption that what a person's character and 
dispositions do not causally determine, they do not render absolutely 
certain" (Adams[77],pn6). For his argument to be at all successful It 
seems that It must be construed in the following way. Either there are 
grounds for believing 
{!) if p were to obtain, then x would freely do A 
v/hich Imply that p necessitates x's freely doing A, or there are no such 
grounds. Needless to say, if the grounds of this statement do imply 
this, then x does in fact not freely do A, for free acts are not causally 
determined - (F1). On the other hand. If there are no such grounds, then 
there are no grounds at all for believing this statement. For If p does 
not necessitate x's doing A then p does not causally determine it, and so 
does not render it absolutely certain. But, in general, 
(2) "if P 'T'/ere true, then q yyould be true" implies that p. If it occurs, 
renders q absolutely certain. 
Hence if p does not necessitate x's doing A then "if p vv'ere true, then x 
would freely do A" is folse. And so either way there ccrn be no grounds 
for believing statements of this form. 
However, the crux of this argument, (2), is false. In making 
subjunctive statements v/e do rfoi require that the antecedent make the 
conclusion absolutely ceridin{\x\ the very strong sense that it seems 
Adams requires). My releasing a pen from my outstretched hand, and 
expecting that it will fall on the ground, is a case in point. If I v/ere to 
release said pen, then it wouJd fall on the ground, even though my 
releasing it does not make it absolutely certain that it will do so, for it 
is not absolutely certain that there will not be a sudden upward gust of 
wind that will blovy the pen back into my hand. (2) demands a connection 
betyyeen p and q v/hich is much too strong. And it seems that (2) v/ould 
be accepted only by someone who held the view that the pertinant 
subjunctive connection between p and q could only obtain if p v/as 
causally sufficient for q, or perhaps if a weaker statement such as (S) 
were true. Another counter-example is provided by Adams himself. It 
seems uncontroversial that were I to ask my butcher to sell me a pound 
of ground beef, he would (freely) do so. But, because his freely doing so 
Implies that his act was not causally determined, my asking him did not 
render his complying absolutely certain. (We examine later hovi' Adams 
attempts to deal with this.) 
Not all of Adams's arguments, however, depend crucially on the 
assumption that what a person's character and dispositions do not 
causally determine, they do not render absolutely certain. A better 
argument has as a starting point (F1), the view that free actions are not 
causally determined. There are those who believe that if this is so then 
it follows that x's freely doing A is uncaused; it is independent of, not 
related to, anything that came before; A is something that x just did\ 
x's doing A was rdndom It follows that can be true no statement of the 
form (1). For suppose that such a statement vv'ere true. Then p's being 
the case would come (temporally) before x's freely doing A (see 
condition (C4)), and as this later event is independdnt of dJI thoi would 
come before, then 
(3) if p were true, then x might not freely do A (or then again, x 
might). 
As (3) Is inconsistent v/ith (1), it follows that no statement of the 
form (1) could be true. Hence the construal of free acts as uncaused 
events implies that agent counterfactuals are necessarily false, and so 
useless for the purposes of Plantlnga's argument. 
A first (periiaps desperate) response to this might be to claim 
that while any particular free act Is uncaused (and so random), a 
statement such as (1) might be true on the basis of x's character. That 
Is, while accepting that x's doing A Is uncaused. It follows from 
(4) If It Is In x's character to do A when p obtains, then If p were 
true, then x would freely do A 
that (1) Is possible, and so the above argument must be Incorrect. This 
only follows, of course, if It Is possible that it be in x's character to do 
A when p obtain. But If all free acts are construed as uncaused, as 
random, then there Is no Important sense In which a person can be said 
to have a character, for such an entity could play no role at all in that 
person's behaviour. Rather than establishing the possibility of agent 
subjunctives, (4) points out Instead that there is no coherent notion of 
character if free acts are underetood as all being uncaused. 
There is another, similar, point to be mode against this 
understanding - it leaves reasons no place at all In the picture of 
agency. If x's doing A Is Independent of all that came before, then it is 
independent of the reasons that x might have had for doing It. Perhaps 
reasons play a smaller role than Is usually assumed, but it Is just false 
that they (necessarily) play no role. 
Thus reasons must make It into the picture. There seem to be a 
number of ways of doing this, depending on how one thinks that the 
having of reasons is causally related to actions, and how the having of 
reasons is Itself causally related to that which proceeded it. On the one 
hand it may be that 
(5a) the reasons x had for doing A (say, the "strongest" reasons) 
causally determined x's doing A; and (In order to maintain 
incompatibilism) that the having of the reason was Itself 
uncaused. 
Or, perhaps, 
(5b) the reasons x hod for doing A cousolly determined x's doing A; 
and that the having of the reason v-zas itself causally influenced, 
without being necessitated. 
Alternctlively, 
(5c) the reasons x hod for doing A influenced, but did not necessitate, 
x's doing A; and the having of the reasons Vv'as itself causally 
determined. 
Examining these in turn, Y-/e see that the first suffers from the 
same problems as did our more simplistic view of free agency. For if x 
had reasons R for doing A then it follows by reasoning similar to above 
that 
(6) if p Y/ere true, then x might not have had reasons R for doing A. 
(It is important to keep in mind here the distinction between, on the one 
hand, there tieing a reason R for x to do A, and, on the other, x's hdving 
a reason R for doing A. There might have st i l l been a reason R for x to do 
A, Y/ithout X being avv'are of it, without x having had the reason.) 6ut as 
x's having reason R to do A causally determines x's doing A, then 
(following Hume) 
(7) if X hod not had reasons R to do A, then x would not have freely 
done A. 
But from (6) and (7) it follows that (1) is false. This method of 
allov'/ing reasons into the picture is inadequate. 
The first also shares with the second the defect of implying that 
free acts are causally determined, specifically by the reasons R that x 
had for doing A. Thus (9a) and (9b) are unacceptable. 
We seem, then, to be left with (5c) as an explanation of the role 
of reasons in agency. This explanation v/ill be coherent if V'/e have a 
coherent noti.on of "influence, without necessitation". Given as much, 
this second argument of Adams's is not successful because by supposing 
that non-causally determined events are ipso facto uncaused (that is, 
random), it attributes to Libertarians a quite implausible view of free 
action. Again, it seems that this supposition would only be accepted by 
someone who had already decided that (S) offers the only plausible 
understanding of agent subjunctives. 
A more elaborate and Imposing argument is presented by Adams 
- 2.1 -
towards the eriu of his paper (Ad6rris[77],pl13-114). He claims, 
correctly, that theists like Plantinga attempt to employ statements 
such as 
(8) If God created Adam and Eve, there would be more moral good 
than moral evil In the history of the world 
to explain why God created Adam and Eve. They do this because of the 
truth of (8) and because He Is all-good and so desires the best for his 
creatures. It Is an Important part of their case that (8) be prior In the 
order of explanation than God's creating Adam and Eve, as the former Is 
Intended, In part, to explain the latter According to Levv'ls's analysis of 
subjunctives, (8) could only be true If there was a world in which God 
created Adam and Eve and there was more moral good than evil In Its 
history v/hlch Is closer to the actual vyorld than any v/orld In which God 
created Adam and Eve and there was not more moral good than evil In 
Its history. But, Adams continues, v/hlch world Is closest to the actual 
world depends. In part, on which world Is actual, and this depends In 
turn on v/hether or not God created Adam and Eve. Thus God's created 
Adam and Eve cannot come dfier\.\\9i truth of (8) In the order of 
explanation. 
However, the truth of (8), namely the truth of: there was a world 
In Y'/h1ch God created Adam and Eve and . . . , depends not on the fact that 
it Is this particular world (Kronos, remember) which Is actual, but 
rather that the actual world, v/hlchever It Is, Is one In which (8) Is true. 
There are many other worlds In which this may be so - following 
Adams, let us call K* the set of worlds In which (8) Is true. The truth of 
(8) depends on the actual world's being a member of K* but not on which 
member of K* It Is (Including Kronos). The thelst needs to claim that 
the actual v/orld Is a member of K* and that Its membership In K* does 
not depend on which of the alternatives amongst which God Is choosing. 
Adams attempts to make all this more perspicuous: 
Let us say that one of God's alternatives Is represented In K* If 
and only If there Is some world In K* In v^hlch he chooses that 
alternative. [(9):] If any of the alternatives amongst which God 
was choosing Is not represented In K*. then the actual v^orld's 
membership In K* depends on His rejecting that alternative, and 
therefore cannot be prior In the order of explanation to His 
decision. But I think that [(10):] at least one of God's 
alternative's Is Indeed unrepresented In K*. For one alternative 
WQs to make no free creatures oi oil, ond j do not see how o 
V'/orld in V'/hich there are no free creatures at all could be a 
member of K* (Adams[77],p114 Underlining added). 
Before critically examining this argument, we wil l simplify it by 
employing the definitions that Adams has introduced. It turns out to be 
not as Imposing as it appears. First, the actual world is an element of 
K* If and only if (8) is true, as p is true sfrnplicfier if and only if i t Is 
true in the actual v^orld - "the actual world's membership in K*" is thus 
equivalent to "(8)'s being true". Next, an alternative A Is represented In 
K* If and only If there Is a possible v^orld VV In which God brings It 
about that A, and which Is a member of K*. That is, if and only if it is 
logically possible that God brings it about that A and that (8) be true. 
Thus Adams's argument comes to the following: 
(9') If A is one of the alternatives among which God was choosing, 
and It is not possible that God brings it about that A and (8) be 
true, then (8)'s truth depends on the truth of "God does not bring 
It about that A". 
But 
(10') It Is not possible that God refrain from creating free beings 
(one of the alternatives among which He was choosing) and that 
(8) be true. 
Hence 
(11) (8)'s truth depends on the truth of "God does not refrain from 
creating free beings". 
For the argument to be valid, "depends" must here be understood in such 
a way that 
(12) If p and q are true, and p's truth depends on q's truth, then p is 
not an explanation for q. 
Therefore, 
(13) (8)'s truth is not an explanation of God's not refraining from 
creating free beings, and so not an explanation of God's creating 
Adam and Eve. 
It Is possible to deny (9')^^, but in any case the important point 
at which the Libertarian may apply pressure Is at ( 1 0 ' ) . HOY-/ could this 
be false? That Is, how Is It logically possible that God refrain from 
creating free beings and that (8) sti l l be true? Adams provides the 
following argument for (10'): 
But I think that [(10):] at least one of God's alternative's is 
indeed unrepresented In K*. For one alternative was to make no 
free creatures at all, and I do not see how a v^orld in 'which there 
are no free creatures at all could be a member of K*. Since it is 
free actions that are morally good and morally evil, no possible 
Vv'orld, Y'/, will be a member of K* unless there is some feature of 
'ii by virtue of v^hich a difference of free actions of free 
creatures in some worlds u and v would be a reason for counting 
u es more similar than v to w (in relevant respects). And any 
such feature of v/ must surely involve the existence in w of free 
creatures. If there are no free creatures at all in w, what would 
make vy more like a world in which most free creaturely 
decisions are good ones than like a world in vyhich most free 
creaturely decisions are bad ones? (Adams[77],p114 Underlining 
added). 
The attempt to answer Adams' rhetorical question might begin 
by noticing that there are in this world certain nôiurôl features which 
entice moral behaviour and discourage immoral behaviour (and even if 
there are not, the argument only requires that there could be). This is 
not to say that these features are causally sufficient for such moral 
behaviour, it is just that were such features present in a situation 
Y/here a moral decision is being made, then the morally correct action 
Y^ould be (freely) taken. Now as the existence of these natural features 
of the world is indépendant of the existence of free being.s, then it is 
presumably possible that these very features occur in a world with no 
free beings. The world that Adams' asks for, w, is such world. It is 
more similar (in the relevant, moral, respects) to a Y/orld, u, in Yvhich 
most free creaturely decisions are good ones than to any world, v, in 
which most are bad. Not because of the dciual amount of moral good 
and bad Y/hich occurs in y/ as compared to that which occurs in u and v, 
for by hypothesis there is no moral good or bad in w, lacking as it is in 
moral agents. The difference, rather, between w, u, and v, is in the 
amount of hypotheiicaJ moral good and evil that each would contain, 
the amount of moral good and evil that would result Y^ere God to create 
Adam and Eve. World w is more similar to u than v because yv', like u, is 
such that were God to create Adam and Eve, there Y/ould be more moral 
good than evil in the history of the world. While w contains no free 
beings, counterfactual statements refering to the actions of agents, 
were there to ùe dny, can be true. As Plantinga points out when 
discussing the criteria for the similarity of Y/orlds: 
One measure of similarity betv-zeen worlds involves the question 
whether they shsre the some counterfQctuols. (p]ont1ng8[74b], 
pi 78). 
It is (8)'s being true in w and u, and not in v, that explains why w and u 
are more similar to each other than w is to v. As can be seen, this reply 
to Adams depends on the possibility of agent subjunctives - the very 
possibility that Adams attempts to deny. In asking the rhetorical 
question he does, Adams' begs the question against Plantinga. 
Adams seems, in fact, to hold a rather unexpected view in these 
matters. He seems to agree vfith Plantinga that free acts are causally 
undetermined: 
The Jesuits held, amonst other things, that many human actions 
are free in the sense that their agents are not logically or 
causally determined to do them. ("Free" will alv/ays be used in 
this sense in the present essay) (Adams[77l,p109) 
As we have seen, he also believes that subjunctives entail that their 
consequents are causally determined, and from this it follows that 
there can be no true agent subjunctives. He is frank, hovi'ever, when he 
admits being perplexed by the fact that there ¿T'̂ ? appear to be true 
subjunctives of this form: 
There does not normally seem to be any uncertainty at all about 
what a butcher, for example, would have done if I had asked him 
to sell me a pound of ground beef, although we suppose that he 
VY'ould have had free will in the matter. We would say he would 
certainly have sold me the meat, if he had it to sell. What makes 
us regard it as certain? Chiefly his character, habits, desires, 
and intentions, and ths absense of countervailing dispositions. 
(Adams[77],p115-116) 
There seem, according to Adams, to be three general ways out. First, 
one could say that true subjunctives putatively of the form "if p were 
true, then x would freely do A" are more correctly understood as "if p 
were true, then x vvould probdbJy freely do A". It is character, habits, 
etc,, vyhlch make this latter subjunctive true (though not the former). 
Second, one could say that such a statement is true because x's freely 
doing A Vv'as causally determined. By Adams' own admission, this is 
inconsistent. Third, one could claim, that x's doing A is not causally 
determined by p, although the latter does render the former "absolutely 
certain". Because Adams thinks that subjunctives require such absolute 
certainty (a claim Vv'lth v-zhlch we disagreed above) and because such 
certainty Is only to be got by causal determination, then nor Is this path 
open to Adams. He seems left with the first suggestion. 
Unfortunately for Adams, however, any success In his arguments 
against Plantlnga Vv'ould mitagate against his ovv'n diagnosis of the 
situation. If character and reasons provide no ground for agent 
subjunctives, then neither do they for probabilistic agent subjunctives. 
Either Adams accepts the "Incline, without necessitating" role of 
character and reasons in action, or he doesn't. If he does, then (as we 
have argued In section ill - condition (C2)) a basis for agent 
subjunctives can be provided. If not, then It seems as though the only 
account Adams has available Is that actions are uncaused, that Is, 
random. (If this Is not so, then the onus Is on him to provide yet dnoiher 
account of the relation between reasons and action.) But if this Is so, 
then not only could there be no true agent subjunctives, but there could 
be no true probabilistic agent subjunctives, either. For Adams says that 
the claim that 
(14) If David stayed In Kellah, Saul would probdtfly beselge the city 
Is to be understood as the claim that 
(15) Saul Yv'lll besiege the city 
would tiB probable, given the facts that would (definitely, not just 
probably) obtain If David stayed In Kellah. But If Soul's (freely) 
besieging the city Is uncaused. If It Is thus unrelated to anything that 
came before, then there Is nothing that v/ould make It protfdtda^hQre Is 
nothing that would make n more likely than his not besieging the city. 
Adams' diagnosis Is unsuccessful. 
Adams's arguments are, like Hobart's, Ineffective against a 
Libertarian armed with a coherent notion that satisfies (CI) to (C5). His 
arguments beg the question to the extent that they assume that there Is 
no such notion. 
VI 
There are many Interpretations of the claim that evil is a 
problem for one v^ho believes in God. in the introduction we narrov'/ed 
our focus in a number of v^ays. V/e adopted an understanding of the term 
"God" that has changed as a consequence of our discussions (see Notes 5 
and 7). It is ncw encapsulated in the statements: 
(61) there is a unique person (conscious and existing "in time") v-zho is 
all-pov'/erful, all-knowing, and all-good. And this being v/e call 
God. 
(G2'b) A being x is all-powerful only if x can strongly actualise every 
possible state of affairs p such that "x strongly actualises p" is 
consistent; 
(G3') X is all-knovying if and only if x knows all true propostions p 
such that "X knov/s p" is consistent; and 
(G4) X is all-good if and only if x does only what is permitted, 
and everijthing that x (morally) ought. 
'We also restricted ourselves to consideration of mordJ evil (that evil 
v/hich results from free human action) and understood "free human 
action" itself in Libertarian terms. Specifically, we assumed that 
(F1) if X freely does A, then x's freely doing A is not causally 
determined, and 
(F2) it is logically possible (vv'ith appropriate, minimal, restrictions) 
that statements of the form "if p were true, then x would freely 
do A" to be true. 
And finally, we only considered the logicoî problem of moral evil: How 
is it logicdJJy possible tf-idt God exist ônd tiiot tiiere ùe evil resulting 
from free /7i/mân ôcts? 
V</e savy In section I that, according to îlackie, this is not 
logically possible. His argument claimed that as God can do anything 
that is possible, and as everyone's always doing v/hat is right is 
possible, then God ought to have created a morally perfect world. 
Plantinga's reply, in section 11, proceeded as follows: it is 
possible (and, indeed, probable) that if God created free persons and 
left them to their own devices, all would sometimes freely do v/rong. 
Notvvlthstanding His povv'er, knov/ledge and goodness, there is nothing 
that God wouiu be able to do about this, for what free persons do Is 
solely up to them. God's existing (and being ail-pov/erful, all-knovv'ing, 
and all-good) does not enidii that there Is no evil resulting from free 
human acts, for whether or not there will be depends on the free human 
agents. Thus it Is logically possible that God exist and that there be 
evil resulting from free human acts. 
As Plantlnga v/ould readily admit, this argument depends 
crucially on the Libertarlanism embodied In (F1) and (F2). How dre (FÌ) 
ár/d (F2') joir/tiy possiùJe, and what understanding of agent subjunctives 
does Plantinga require if his argun-ient is to ùe va/id? Jhes^ tv/o 
questions briefly occupied us In section III, where the focus of the 
paper moved from theological to metaphysical Issues. We saw that the 
subjunctive that Plantinga requires, denoted by "p • - > q", is to satisfy a 
number of conditions: 
It Is to provide a basis for ordinary subjunctives which does not imply 
that It is causally determined that the consequent obtain: 
(CD p • - > q does not imply that q is causally determined, 
(C2) p • - > q implies that if p were true, then q Vv'ould be true. 
it is to be, In a certain minimal sense, a causal notion: 
(C3) p q does not imply p q, 
(C4) If (p is true at t̂  • - > q is true at \.2) then t̂  is no later than Í2-
Finally, It Is to be understood in such a way as to make it most likely 
that Plantinga's argument is valid: 
(C5) "p • - > q" behaves, for the most part, like what we usually 
understand by the locution "if p v '̂ere true, then q would be true". 
ir there Yv'ere a notion which satisfied these conditions, then 
Plantinga's argument vv'ould be vindicated. Indeed, It appeared that the 
Libertarian "Inclines, without necessitating" is just what Is required, if 
tt/ere is a (coherent) notion of meaning, vYithout necessitating",, ti^fen 
it is iogicaiig possiùie tf/at God exist and that there he evil which 
results from free human acts 
V/e examined significant criticisms of Plantinga's position 
v/hlch reduced to the claim that (F1) and (F2) are jointly Incompatible 
with the observation that 
(S) subjunctive statements in general can be true only if there are 
other factors which, v-zith the antecedent's being true, causally 
determine the consequence's being true. 
As we have seen in section IV, Hobart believes that both (F2) and (S) are 
true, and as a result holds that free action actually requires 
determination. On the other hand, Adams argued in section V that as 
(F1) and (S) are true, then (F2) cannot be true. In addition, he atternped 
to give an account (albeit unsuccessfully) of V'/hy (F2) appears to be 
true. In both these sections the arguments obtain v^hatever purchase 
they have by arguing from (S), which Is at least to deny the coherence 
of the "inline, V'/lthout necessitating" notion. But to employ this premise 
is to beg the question against Plantlnga. 
Thus i t seems that if iiiere is o (coiierent)notion of "inclining, 
witiioui necessiioting", ti^fen it is logicellg possitde that God exist end 
if/dt there be evil wiiicii results from free iiurnon dcts But is there 
such a notion? 
NOTES 
1- For the relevant passages, see i1cCloskey[60], p97 and A1ken[57l, 
p79. 
2. Subjunctives will play a pivotal role In our discussions, so we 
take the opportunity at this point to Introduce some ternrilnology. 
In general, we understand such a statement to be of the form "If p were 
true, then q v/ould be true". A probabilistic subjunctive Is one of the 
form "If p Y/ere true, then It vyould probably be true that q". (We will 
not encounter these until section V). An agent subjunctive, as we have 
just seen. Is a subjunctive of the form "If p vyere true, then x would 
freely do A". 
3. There ore those think that this Is already too anthropomorphic on 
understanding of God's nature to be correct. For example, Kroon 
comments that the type of occount thot Plontlngo offers 
does not admit any 'In principle' difference between the case of 
God and the case of humans. God, like his creatures, acts against 
the background of the actual world. More of the actual Vv'orld Is 
directly attributable to him than to us, of course, but 
nonetheless the difference looks. In an Important sense, 
quantitative only. This startllngly anthropomorphic conclusion Is 
the price we pay for [such an account], (Kroon[81],p91) 
But this seems Inadequate. Firstly, the notion of a seperate conscious 
being seems to be requirecJ If sense Is to be made of the Idea of God's 
relating at all to the world, via action and knov/ledge. If we say that 
God spoke with Hoses, we mean, do we not?, that Moses v/as standing at 
the top of the mountain communicating with another, separate, 
conscious being. It Is just very difficult to see how one could 
cornmurncoie with a being that was not conscious and that was not "In 
time". Secondly, just how anthropomorphic is this understanding of 
consciousness anyway, v/hen It includes not only bats, but also any 
Martians that there might be? To say that there Is something It Is like 
to be an Martian Is not to say that know vv'hat It Is (or that Vv'e even 
could knoYi'). To say that there Is something It Is like to be God Is not to 
say that Y/e know Y/hat it Is, and this Is Y/hat might be Y/orryIng some. 
The onus Is on philosophers such as Kroon to provide an explanation of 
- -
Y'/hy (Gl) is Incorrect, if It is. Prims fscie, it seems acceptable. 
4. But Bennett, in a reply to Plantinga, believes that this statement 
is consistent, and only has the appearance of being inconsistent 
because of the "logician's convention of expressing statements 
tenselessly" (Bennett[73],p44). When interpreted as "God could have 
brought about a state of affairs that wds not (in fact) brought about by 
God" the temptation to think the original statement inconsistent, says 
Bennett, disappears. This is true, but why should it be interpreted in 
this way? If, on the contrary, it is interpreted as "God can now bring 
about a (past) state of affairs that W6S not (in fact) brought about by 
God" then it is again overwhelmingly tempting to say that the original 
statement is inconsistent, for it is not logically possible (even for God) 
to change the past. 
But no matter which of these is the intended interpretation, it is 
easy to shov/ that (G2), while a popular understanding of God's 
omnipotence, is still false. Of the modes in which God may be 
omnipotent, there are theistic doctrines which hold that God is 
omnipotent riecessQilly (in all possible v^orlds), and others which hold 
that He is so esseniidJly (in all possible worlds in which He exists). V̂ e 
assume only that God is omnipotent ornniiernpordUy (at all times, in 
the actual v/orld). It follows then, with (G2), that 
(1) at all times t, if p is a logically possible state of affairs, then 
God can bring it about that p 
end so, es whatever logical status a statement has it has at all times, 
(2) if p is a logically possible state of affairs, then at all times t, 
God can, at t, bring it about that p. 
But (2) Is false, for it is not logically possible to novy influence (and d 
fortiori change) past events, even though it is logically possible that 
they were different. We present the following counterexample to (2). 
Suppose that, in spite of its being only just above freezing, it does not 
snow on Tuesday. Presumably, it is logically possible that it did. Hence 
it follows from (2) that God can, on Wednesday, bring it about that it 
snoY'/ on Tuesday. But this is false as there is nothing that God can do on 
V/ednesday (the day after) that would result in its snowing on Tuesday. 
onversly, it is easy to see that God can, on Monday (the day 
before), bring It about that It snow on Tuesday. For there I s something 
that God can do on Monday, namely dropping the temperature even 
further, that Vv'ould result In I ts snowing on Tuesday. We mention this 
last point to forestall the fatal ist ic argument that as statements such 
as "It snowed on Tuesday" are. If true, true at all times, then we are as 
pOY/erless to Influence the future as the above counterexample shov'/s 
that Y/e are to Influence the past. Thus (G2) I s false, and this f i rst 
cr i t ic i sm of Hackle 's argument stands. 
5 - Thus our original definition of omnipotence, which was given by 
(G2) X I s omnipotent if and only If x can bring about all logically 
possible states of affairs, 
needs to be modified to 
(G2') X i s omnipotent if and only If x can bring about all logically 
possible states of affairs p such that "x brings It about that p" i s 
logically possible 
because there are some states of affairs, those In the past, which It I s 
not logically possible for God to now change (and so not something that 
He can nov-/ bring about), even though it I s logically possible that they 
were different. This i s a consequence of God's being "in time". 
it turns out that the original definition of omniscience, that 
(G3) X is omniscient if and only if x knows all true propositions, 
needs to be modified In just the same way, to obtain 
(G3') X I s omniscient If and only if x knows all true propositions p 
such that "X knovys that p" is logically possible. 
This is a consequence of God's being a conscious entity. Kretzmann In 
Kretzmann[66l presents the folloY-zing conterexample to (G3): Consider 
the two statements: 
(1) Cathy knows that she is In hospital. 
(2) Cathy knows that Cathy I s in hospital. 
The tv-/o are perfectly coherent and furthermore logically Independent. 
For If Cathy has amnesia but recognises that she is In a hospital, then 
( 0 is true and (2) false, and If Cathy has anrmesia and reads in the paper 
that someone called Cathy is in hospital, but does not recognise that 
she Is In a hospital then, (2) Is true, and (1) false. Thus what Is krmin 
by Cathy In (1) (that she Is in hospital) differs from what she knovv's In 
(2) (that Cdihy Is in hospital). But what Cathy knows in ( 0 can only be 
knoY/n by Cathy, and no other person, including God. Only Cathy knows 
(and could knov/) Yv'hat it is to like her, what is it for her\si be in 
hospital. Thus it is possible that there be a true proposition that God 
does not (and cannot) know. 'The kind of knowledge [(1)] ascribes to 
[Cathy] Is, moreover, the kind of knowledge characteristic of every 
self-conscious entity, of every person" (Kretzmann[66],p421). If God's 
omniscience is to be possible, then (G3) is false. That it is not JogicdUy 
possible that God knows what Cathy knows In (1) suggests that the 
modification v/e require is (G3') above. Thus God's Inability to know 
something that it is logically impossible for Him to know is not to 
count against his omniscience. 
6- There Is, however, some reason to doubt this. For as Bennett 
points out: 
There ore different ways In which things con be such that people 
refrain from doing certain sorts of acts, and not just any way 
Involves a loss of free-vv'111. (Bennett[73],p48) 
Suppose It actually turns out that all vyrongdoers possess a certain 
chromosome - the dreaded R-chromosome - vt'hich partially explains 
their wrongdoing. That Is to say that all wrong-doers necessarily have 
the chromosome, but there are possessors of the chromosome who, 
thanks to strong moral fibre, never sin. The R-chromosome, though 
being causally necessary for wrongdoing. Is not causally sufficient for 
such behaviour. Next, suppose that the only behaviour that God engages 
in, after creating the world at year dot and letting evolution run Its 
path. Is to causally determine that fetuses with the R-chromosome are 
spontaneously aborted. (This does not entail miraculous Intervention, 
for It might just be another type of spontaneous abortion which occurs 
due to abnormalities In the fetus. Possession of the R-chromosorne 
could count as another type of "abnormality".) In such a v^orld God has 
strongly brought it about that (there are free persons and they always 
do Vv'hat is right) even though, due to the limited purview of His actions, 
there is no free person upon yyhose wi l l God has infringed. All acts are 
thus free, and so this situation is one consistent vyith the truth of (F1), 
but In Yv'hich (4'ar) is true, it Is plarnnly noi true that the only v-zay for 
God to strongly bring it about that there are free persons and that they 
alY/ays do what Is right Is to create some free beings and strongly bring 
it about that they do only Vv'hat Is right. 
One might not be too Impressed with this argument of Bennett's. 
For, one could say. If the possession of the R-chromosome Is causally 
necessary for wrongdoing, then the absence of the R-chrornosome Is 
causally sufficient for good behaviour, and so the people V'/ho did 
manage to make It Into the world are not. In fact, free, as their good 
behaviour Is causally determined by this absence. There Is, then, some 
doubt about (Fl)'s Implying the falsity of (4'a1). 
7. Needless to soy, if Plontlngo is correct In denying (2"), our 
modified account of God's omniscience 
(G2') Is omnipotent If and only if x can bring about all logically 
possible states of affairs p such that "x brings It about that p" Is 
logically possible (see Note 5) 
needs to be modified further Plantlnga himself makes no attempt to 
Indicate v-zhat this further modification might be, but perhaps it would 
be along the following lines. The basic Idea behind Plantinga's denial of 
(2") 1s that God's s'̂ 'edk capabilities vary from world to vyorld. 
Presumably, hov/ever. His strong capabilities do not (there seems to be 
no reason why they should). Thus 
(G2") X is omnipotent only If x can strongly bring about all logically 
possible state of affairs p such that "x strongly brings it about 
that p" is logically possible. 
(G2") does not provide o sufficient for x's being omnipotent, 
for there could be beings vyhich, essentially, could strongly do only one 
thing, A. If the above condition were sufficient, and there were such 
beings, and they could do A, then they would be omnipotent, for it would 
be logically impossible that they have any further (strong) powers. 
However, it is not plausible to suggest that beings Vv'ith such a small 
repertoire of strong behaviour be omnipotent. 
8, The primary reference employed is Lewis[73]. There are a few 
comments that need to be made about Lewis's theory. First, there 
is much dispute as to the coherence and usefulness of the relation of 
compsrltlve si mil on ty between possible worlds. Lewis provides 
precise criteria that this relation must satisfy (see pp48-50). 'We 
mention the existence of these conditions in order to indicate that any 
notion satisfying these requirements would be adequate, and to leave 
open the question of v/hether there is any such relation. 
The more important point, however, is Lewis's claim that 
subjunctives are not any strict conditional: Every strict conditional 
"Necessarily, If p then q" implies "Necessarily, if p and r then q" for any 
proposition r. But It is possible that the follov'/ing be true together: 
(1) If Otto had come, It would have been a lively party; but 
(2) If both Otto and Anna had come, it would have been a dreary 
party. 
Hence, the statement "if p were true, then q would be true" Is not 
equivalent to any statement of the form "Necessarily, if p then q" and so 
not equivalent to the strict conditional "p Is causally sufficient for q". 
'We will examine arguments in sections IV and V which seem to be based 
on the conflation of these different locutions. 
9. 'While the move from •(61^ -> GC) and 6C •-> W to 61̂  •-> W is 
valid, the situation Is a little more subtle than It appears, for in 
general, the Inference 
q •-> r 
•(p -> q) 
p •-> r 
Is Invalid for subjunctives. (Suppose, borrowing from Lewis, that Otto 
Is V/aldo's successful rival for Anna's affections. Waldo still tags 
around after Anna, but never njns the risk of meeting Otto. Otto, for his 
own part, intensely dislikes parties (he hates having to make 
srnall-talk) so that his having been to a recent party Is not only false, 
but decidedly far-fetched. Anna, however, almost did go. it follows that 
if Arma had gone, then Waldo would have also, for Otto would still not 
have gone (his dislike of parties exceeds his love for Anna, the cad!), 
and Waldo, knowing this, Vi'ould have felt secure that he would not meet 
Otto, and so Vv'ould have gone. Also, Oito'e and Anna's going to the party 
implies Anna's going But if Otto had gone (an unlikely event., to tie 
sure), iheif Wsido woiz/if r/otfy&yaJht inference Is thus invalid). Whot is 
valid, however, is the inference 
•(r -> q) 
q • -> r 
•(p -> q) 
p • -> r 
Where r is a possible v/orld VV, which includes a possible state of 
affairs q, then DiV-/ -> q) is true, and so the inference 
oq 
q • - > V̂  
•(p -> q) 
p • -> W 
Is valid. More generally, while 
p n - > q 
q • -> r 
p • - > r 
is not valid (Lewis calls it the fallacy of transitivity), the following 
inference is: 
q 0-> p 
pD ->q 
q r 
p • - > r 
10. But is (9) logically possible? Plantinga offers no argument but 
thinks that it^is "clearly consistent". Perhaps v̂ 'e can offer the 
following. Suppose that 
(1) (a) God exists, (b) that anyone that V'/ould be created v-zould 
suffer from transv/orld depravity, (c) that every Vv'orld Y/ith free 
creatures who Qlrnost always do what is right is better than (c1) 
any v/orld v/ith no free agents, and (c2) any v/orld with free 
agents v^ho do not almost alvv'ays do v^hat is right, and (d) that 
there is a v-zorld 'W in which all free perons almost alv-zays do 
vyhat is right. 
Then God, if He is all-good, would create a world at least as good as W. 
Such a world, however, would have free creatures, so that it follov^s 
from (1) that 
(2) God creates a world with free creatures. 
As (1) is logically possible and entails (2), then it is logically possible 
that God exist. He create free persons, and that they all suffer from 
transworld depravity. (1), above, seems more clearly consistent than 
(11.9). 
11. This is not the only criticism of Plentinga's notion of "weak 
actualisation". Chemoff, for example, claims that 
Plantinga's argument encounters ... serious problems, due to the 
use of counterfactuals that emply the terms "actualization" and 
"world", like . . . If God had actualized C, Vv'orld W vv'ould be 
actual. (Chernoff[80],p269) 
The charge is made that 
(the possible world analysis] analyses "If God had actualized 
world W . . . " as "In the closest v/orld to the actual v/orld in 
Y/hich God actualizes V̂  . . .". This is either a flat contradiction 
or sheer nonsense. (Chernoff(80],p269) 
The core of Chernoff's complaint seems to be that Plantinga's possible 
world analysis of "weak actualisation" is nonsense when applied to 
possible worlds themselves. In reply, we attempt to provide two 
understandings of the locution "God can weakly actualise a possible 
world Vf. 
The first, from Burch[79j, Is based on the Lewis understanding of 
counterfactuals. God can vyeakly actualises Vi' if andf only If there is 
some state of affairs C that God can strongly actualise such that GC 
U-y V'/. But GC • -> 'W if and only if either GC is impossible or there is a 
possible world V-/* In V'/hich GC and W obtain V'/hich Is closer (to the 
actual V'/orld) than any world In -which GC and not-V/ obtain. But If 
possible world V̂  obtains In V̂ *, then the two are the same, and so GC 
•-> V'/ If and only If GC Is Impossible or GC holds in 'W and Vy is closer 
(to the actual v/orld) than any GC-v/orld (that is, a v/orld in which GC 
obtains). Thus GC •-> Vî' if and only if GC is impossible or is the 
closest GC-y/orld (to the actual world). But for God's strong 
capabilities, vv'hat is logicôJJy possible for God to do coincides vt'ith 
what God can do (see (G2") in P̂ ote 7). That is, God can strongly 
actualise C if and only if GC is logically possible. Hence 
(1) God can weakly actualise W if and only if there is some state of 
affairs C for which W Is the closest GC-world (to the actual 
YîTorld). 
The relation of closeness (based on comparltlve similarity) 
bet'ween possible 'worlds is the subject of much dispute and so 'we 
provide a second understanding of the locution "God can 'weakly 
actualise possible world W. Again, this last is true if and only If there 
is some state of affairs C that God can strongly actualise such that GC 
•-> W. But, to say that V̂  obtains is to say that every state of affairs p 
in obtains. Hence GC •-> W is equivalent to GC •-> (for all p in W, p 
is true) 'Which in turn is equ1valent(?) to (for all p In W, GC •-> p). Thus 
(2) God can 'weakly actualise W if and only if there Is some state of 
affairs C that God can strongly actualise such that for all states 
of affairs p in Vt', GC •-> p. 
This is equivalent to 
(3) God con weakly actualise W if and only If there Is some set S of 
states of affairs, that God can strongly actualise together, such 
that for all states of affairs p in 'W there is a Cp In S such that 
GCp •-> p. 
The state of affairs C in (2) is the conjunction of the states of affairs 
of S in (3). Chernoff's complaint was that a locution such as "God can 
weakly actualise W is meaningless because It involves counterfactuals 
•which refer to ('whole) possible v/orlds. The analysis provided by (3) 
shov'/s that this is not in fact a problem because such locutions are 
equivalent to statements involving counterfactuals as Innocuous as "if 
God 'were to new set off the alarm (Cp), then Anna 'would a'wake and have 
cornflakes for breakfest (p)". Chernoff's complaint is unfounded. 
12. Burch gives a particularly succinct proof of this statement by 
employing (1) of Note 11. He firstly shoY/s that 
(1) If God can actualise 'W, then GT,̂  • - > W. 
For suppose that there is some state of affairs C such that 6C is 
possible and 6C • - > The V-/ is the nearest possible world containing 
6C. Hence contains 6C. (GC is possible by hypothesis. Hence by 
definition, T^ includes C, and so GT^ includes GC.) Hence V̂  is the 
nearest possible world containing GT.̂ . (If not, then there is a closer 
possible world V/* containing GT^ and so also GC - v^hich is not 
possible.) Hence GT.̂  • - > W. It is then shovyn that 
(2) If GC is possible and GC • - > and GC • - > W* then W = Vt'*. 
As GC Is possible V̂  is the closest possible Vv'orld containing GC. As is 
W*. Hence W = W*. But from this it follov/s that 
(3) If God can actualise both W and vy*, then T^ = T^* if and only if 
W = W*. 
For suppose that T^ = T^^, then as God can actualise W and W*, we get 
GT • - > Vî  and GT^^ • -> W*, and so GT^ • -> V^*. Hence W = W*. The 
\f W 
converse is trivial. 
13. For if the "depends" in (9') Is to be understood In such a way as 
to make (12) true, then It appears to be a more particular 
version of the claim that 
(9") If it is not possible that p be tnje and that x do A, and p is true 
(and so x doesn't do A), then p's truth depends on x's not doing A. 
However, the conjunction of (9") and (12) entails that explanations of 
action do not Imply the act in question. This view is at odds with 
various accounts of explanation, v/here to explain q Is to produce some 
suitable p̂  to p̂ , which jointly entail q. Thus to explain why x murdered 
3 dozen people one might say that x had the R chromosome, and that all 
people Y'/ith this chromosome are (or will become) mass-murderers. 
This Issue of explanation Is a complex one, but these considerations 
seem to cast some doubt upon a crucial premise, (9), of Adams's 
argument. 
Hovvever, this is not the end of the matter Theists claim that 
God didn't refrain from creating free beings because. In part, (8) vyas 
true. But what follovvs from 
(10') (18) Implies that God did not refrain from creating free beings 
Is in fact much stronger than this, namely that He didn't refrain from 
creating free beings orilybecduse (8) v/as true. This no thelst vyants to 
accept, for it would be Inconsistent v/ith their more detailed claim that 
He didn't refrain from creating free beings because (8) was true m d 
tecduse He is all-good end so desires the best for all his creatures, if 
(8)'s being true Implies God's not refraining from creating free beings, 
then it would the total explanation of God's doing this. Thus, pdce 
Adams, it wcajJd be an explanation, but one that no thelst could accept, 
for it allOY'/s no room for God's goodness as part of the explanation. The 
argument is thus: 
(10') (8) implies that God does not refrain from creating free beings. 
(11) (8)'s truth partially explains why God did not refrain from 
creating free beings 
(12) If p partially explains q ,and p Implies q, then p totally explains 
q. Thus 
(13) (8)'s truth totally explains why God did not refrain from 
creating free beings. 
The thelst has a problem, as (10') and (12) seem to be true, and (11) and 
the negation of (13) are part of the theist's doctrine. 
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